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‘You don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone’: Re-contextualising the Origins, 
Development and Impact of the Call Centre 
 
Vaughan Ellis and Phil Taylor 
 
Introduction 
 
In the space of scarcely a decade a diverse literature on the call centre has emerged in the 
broad fields of management and organization studies, and employment relations. Earlier 
simplistic and mistaken depictions, such as the dystopian ‘electronic Panopticon’ 
perspective (Fernie and Metcalf, 1998), have been quickly forgotten as rich empirical 
evidence has produced a more rounded and finely-grained understanding. We now know 
a great deal about work organization, surveillance, managerial control strategies and 
other central concerns of labour process analysis (see Deery and Kinnie, 2004).  
However, as Glucksman (2005) has recently observed there is a tendency to treat call 
centres as ‘self-standing sites of work’ and to detail their ‘internal workings’, at the 
expense of providing broader analysis. It is certainly true that call centres appear in much 
of the literature as disembodied entities, abstracted from their political and economic 
contexts, as recent work in the discipline of occupational psychology epitomises.  
 
For example, Holman (2004) ‘proves’, through a series of empirical tests based on self-
completing survey data, the degree of ‘well-being’ and job satisfaction amongst agents 
working for a UK bank. The outcomes of an approach, which pre-selects the variables for 
analysis, is invariably unsatisfactory, serving merely to establish a series of internalised 
and self-referential statistical relationships, a method which recalls the fundamental 
criticism made by Wright Mills (1959) of ‘abstracted empiricism’, of a tendency in social 
science to sacrifice explanation for statistical assertion. Batt and Moynihan (2004: 34) 
echo this criticism, when they point to the failure of this method to situate individual 
workers in the context of work groups and their social relationships. Unsurprisingly, this 
approach leads to highly questionable generalisations. Holman declares, for instance, that 
in terms of workers’ experiences at least, ‘call centres are not radically different forms of 
work organisation’ (2004: 239) and, bathed in an optimistic glow, ‘call centre work 
compares favourably to shop floor manufacturing and clerical work with regard to well 
being’.  Yet, as much authoritative research on the call centre has demonstrated, its work 
organisation, labour process and the daily experiences its call-handlers have particular – 
even unique – characteristics1. This is true despite recognition that the call centre does 
have organizational antecedents and the fact that, notwithstanding common defining 
features, call centres are not homogeneous.  
 
The intention here is not to isolate for critique one particular author, but to emphasise the 
more general failure to contextualise. It is remarkable how the call centre is often treated 
as a normative phenomenon, without any acknowledgement of the conditions under 
which it emerged as a distinctive organisational form, which reconfigured the customer 
servicing in late capitalism. To cite specific example, both Holman (2004) and Fernie 
                                                          
1 The UK’s Health and Safety Executive, in dubbing the call centre a ‘unique working environment’ 
(2001), succinctly captured the essence of its distinctiveness. 
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(2004), although their case studies are located in the banking sector, neglect to mention 
the profound transformations wrought by the call centre throughout financial services, 
following the path-breaking innovation of branchless, 24-hour, customer servicing by 
First Direct and Direct Line, in banking and insurance respectively (Bain and Taylor, 
2002; Taylor and Bain, 1999). We contend that an understanding of historical context and 
legacy are critical for understanding the very essence of the call centre and for grasping 
the full significance of the profound consequences for work organisation and the 
experience of work that its emergence has generated.  
 
Gluckman’s (2004) frequently insightful remedy to the tendency to internalise is to 
expand the frame of analysis by building on the concept of the total social organisation of 
labour (TSOL). She focuses on process, relationality and the division of labour, thereby 
re-interpreting call centres within a broader sociology of work. In developing five 
differing call configurations - ‘stylized cases’ - which should not, she insists, be regarded 
as a definitive typology, Glucksman inserts the call centre in differing overall processes 
of ‘provision to consumption’. In so doing, the call centre is contrasted with previously 
existing modes of operation and its agents are situated within the wider occupational 
structure. While her reflective piece undeniably represents a considerable advance on 
‘decontextualised’ accounts, it should be seen as complementing studies which have 
already analysed how this telemediated innovation in customer servicing is embedded 
within the wider capitalist political economy (Taylor et al, 2005), and the dynamics of 
markets at macro and sectoral levels (Bain and Taylor, 2002; Taylor and Bain, 2001a).    
 
In seeking to build on this work, this paper, therefore, concurs with the thrust of 
Thompson’s (2003) argument that a focus on the workplace, and work relations alone, 
cannot reveal the most important drivers of organisational change. In order to provide for 
a more complete understanding of the call centre, we need simultaneously a wide-angle 
lens, to broaden the perspective beyond the workplace, and a long lens, to provide 
historical depth (Littler, 1982: 2). The paper begins with an analysis of the reasons for the 
appearance and widespread adoption of the call centre as the preferred mode of customer 
contact, servicing and sales, throughout diverse industrial sectors. While particular 
importance must be attached to innovation and price reduction in the domain of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), the dangers of technological 
determinism are readily acknowledged. The explosive growth of the call centre is as 
much the product of political economic factors; the impact of the policies of deregulation 
and privatisation, restructuring at the levels of industry and/or firm, the intensification of 
economy-wide and sectoral competitive pressure, the growth of the ‘new economy’, and 
underpinning everything the compulsion to maximise profits and reduce costs.  
 
This discussion prefigures the presentation of case study data from British Gas in the UK 
utilities sector. Evidence is drawn firstly, from extensive company and trade union 
documentation and, secondly, from extended interviews based upon oral history methods, 
where a selected cohort of forty-three clerical staff were asked to reflect upon work 
organisation and their experiences during their three decades of continuous employment 
on the same site (Edinburgh). Together these complementary data sets deliver a 
longitudinal perspective, enabling analysis of the dynamics of organisational change and 
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the labour process associated with the arrival of the call centre, and an evaluation of its 
impact on workers’ experiences. Methodologically, this paper breaks new ground, not 
least because it contrasts with the survey snapshots, or interview based data from 
relatively short time frames, that has constituted empirical call centre research to date. 
The evidence is compelling that that the introduction of call centre operations signified a 
qualitative break with pre-existing forms of work organisation. In rapidly becoming 
established as the dominant mode of customer contact, the call centre replaced all but 
minor competing forms of structuring work. In sum, privatised British Gas successfully 
realised its strategic objectives of reasserting control over the labour process, intensifying 
work, and reducing costs in order to deliver shareholder value in volatile markets.  
  
The Call Centre: Origins, Development and Political Economy 
 
When evaluating how and why the call centre became an organisational imperative for 
companies as they restructured the processes of interactive customer contact, it is 
necessary to emphasise, although not to over-privilege, the impact of technological 
innovation and application. Miozzo and Ramirez (2003) and Cave et al (2002) usefully 
document the qualitative advances in information networking technology, which 
generated wider technological and organisational diffusion throughout the services sector. 
These include the digitalisation of telecommunications networks, optical-fibre 
technologies, and connectionless architectures based on Internet protocols, which have 
further facilitated voice and data integration. The dramatic increase in computing 
capacity, and concomitant price reduction, enabled the transmission and processing of 
enormous amounts of data, and integration with these new voice technologies. We have 
always maintained that the call centre has been defined fundamentally by this integration 
of telephonic and computer technologies (Taylor and Bain, 1999: 102), but the key 
innovation was the Automatic Call Distribution (ACD) system, enabling calls to be 
routed to available operators, within (or for that matter between) call centres (Miozzo and 
Ramirez (2003: 69).  
 
The importance of these developments for structuring and pacing work, for increasing the 
range of services capable of being delivered remotely, for increasing labour productivity 
and for monitoring and measuring output, is often downplayed by authors who argue that 
the variable requirements of customers place strict limits on the degree of routinisation 
and standardisation that the technology encourages (Frenkel et al, 1999; Korczynski, 
2002). Despite variations between call centres, whether expressed in terms of strategic 
choice, variations in configuration (Glucksman, 2003), call centre type and market 
segments served (Batt and Moynihan, 2002), or in the dimensions of quality and quantity 
(Taylor et al, 2002), these ICTs undoubtedly influenced work design and the social 
technology of relationships leading to a convergence in the direction of standardisation 
(Houlihan, 2002: 68). It is interesting that the significance of technological innovation 
was more fully appreciated by some earlier researchers of the call centre. The contrast 
with pre-existing forms of work organisation and customer servicing was, to them quite 
stark, precisely because the transformation was recent and abrupt. For example, 
Richardson and Marshall (1996) understood the revolutionary consequences of the 
penetration of these ICTs ‘further into the customer interface’.  
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Although there were always limits to dispersal, the technologies also collapsed distance 
and facilitated geographical flexibility, permitting location and re-location to regions, 
cities and towns characterised particularly by lower (notably labour) costs and supplies of 
skilled labour (Bristow et al, 2000: Richardson and Belt, 2001). The increasing trend to 
offshore to India should be regarded as an extension, however dramatic, of the spatial 
dynamic that is inherent in the call centre project (Taylor and Bain, 2005). Once, of 
course, it is no longer obligatory to situate the loci of servicing in close proximity to 
customers, economies of scale can be realised through the concentration of functions that 
would otherwise be decentralised. From this perspective, the raison d’être of the call 
centre lies in its promise to cut costs and maximise profits through the drawing together 
of customer servicing, or selling, channels. Rather than exemplifying the ‘end of the 
gathered organisation’ (Handy, 1985), many call centres developed into large-scale sites 
of mass service delivery. In Scotland, almost three-quarters of the call centre workforce 
were employed in establishments of 250 or more employees (Taylor and Bain, 1997; 
2001b) with over 1,000 employed at our case study site.  
 
Exceptions to the decontextualised and ahistorical treatment of the call centre include 
those scholars who have identified organisational antecedents. Bain et al (2002) and 
Taylor and Bain (1999), particularly, locate developments within the Taylorism of 
clerical work. Batt and Moynihan (2002) argue that because there were always 
limitations in applying mass production principles to clerical work, call centres represent 
an ‘exceptional case’, precisely because mechanisation now spread into customer contact 
work. Undoubtedly, one of the wellsprings for the later diffusion of the call centre model 
was the telephone operator call centre, providing a model of efficiency as it evolved from 
the old switchboard. Similarly, in a sadly neglected article critiquing the knowledge and 
‘weightless’ economy, Huws (1999) sees call centre agents as the Taylorised progeny of 
earlier office workers, whether bank tellers, ledger clerks, insurance salespeople, booking 
clerks and telephone operators toiling in ‘white collar factories’.  
 
Notwithstanding historical precedent and the advances in ICTs as preconditions, we must 
be mindful of the danger of technological determinism - which undermines the credibility 
of the grander visions of the network society (Castells, 2000 - in explaining why 
companies in the service sector became receptive to the adoption of the call centre. The 
emergence of this distinctive organisational form in the late-1980s is inexplicable without 
reference to the broader political and economic environment of neo-liberalism, de-
regulation, restructuring and the financialisation of markets.  In UK telecommunications 
the state-controlled monopoly, British Telecom, was opened to competition in 1984, 
indicative of a trend to de-regulation which accelerated in the 1990s, following the US’s 
Telecommunications Act and EU liberalisation. Consequently, established incumbents 
such as BT were challenged by new entrants (Mercury/Cable and Wireless) (Fransman, 
2002).  In public utilities, the Gas Act (1986) and the Water Act (1989) saw the public 
flotation of public monopolies and the introduction of commercialisation and competitive 
pressures through cost centres and disaggregation (O’Connell Davidson, 1993). 
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In parallel, the 1986 Financial Services and Building Society Acts precipitated an 
accelerating and ongoing sectoral transformation, facilitating the ‘inter-penetration of the 
hitherto discrete markets’ (Marshall and Richardson, 1996: 1848) of banking, insurance 
and financial services. Competition rapidly intensified, producing instability and 
organisational churn, and extensive merger and acquisition activity, and inextricably 
intertwined with these developments was the application of sophisticated ICTs (Cressey 
and Scott, 1992). Data processing was increasingly taken out of branch facilities and 
concentrated in processing centres, and Girobank and the Bank of Scotland began to offer 
remote banking facilities but the watershed was the launching of branchless voice-based 
operations in banking and insurance, providing 24/7, 365 day services (BIFU, 1995). 
Together, the Midland Bank’s First Direct (1989) and the Royal Bank of Scotland’s 
Direct Line (1988) call centre operations revolutionised the financial services sector (see 
Bain and Taylor, 2002 for a full account; BIFU, 1995).   
 
By the early to mid-1990s there was a rush to catch-up with these patently successful 
innovators and to capitalise on the demonstrable cost-cutting and profit-maximising 
opportunities offered by the call centre. As a senior manager of a Scottish bank admitted, 
‘Once First Direct had done it, the rest of us had to follow’ (Taylor and Bain, 1999: 102). 
However, emulation took place not just in financial services, but throughout the economy 
as call centre operations became established in retailing, telecommunications, leisure and 
entertainment, and travel/holidays (IDS, 1999).  For senior corporate management, such 
as that in British Gas considering ways of restructuring work in tightening competitive 
conditions, the finance and telecommunications sectors had produced a lean, efficient and 
profitable model of customer contact, whose attractions seemed irresistible. Integral to 
this appeal were novel forms of labour utilisation and control, associated with a 
distinctive labour process, where developments in the Taylorist tradition meshed with the 
performance emotional labour (Callaghan and Thompson, 2001; Bain et al, 2002; 
Houlihan, 2002; Taylor, S., 1998; Taylor et al, 2002).    
 
The consequences of introducing call centres have been those usually associated with 
pioneering work systems. While those who first adopt such models gain competitive 
advantage through technical innovation and the enhanced creation and realisation of 
value, imitation by others can see this advantage eliminated as the benefits are shared by 
all. The only way to continue to compete is to use the, now established, work system 
more intensively. Thus, particularly within call centres of the ‘mass production’ type, 
internally and externally generated pressures have led to work intensification, the raising 
of the ubiquitous targets and the maximisation of call-handling times (Taylor et al, 2005). 
In this sense, the introduction of the call centre does not constitute an end point but part 
of a process that can not be abstracted from the dynamic of capitalist accumulation. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
 
The research setting was British Gas’ Edinburgh location, Granton House, which had 
opened in 1969 to house the regional headquarters of the Scottish Gas Board. 
Privatisation in 1986 and subsequent radical changes to company structure and work 
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organisation that accompanied the arrival of the call centre in the mid-1990s, saw the 
number of employed double from around 700 to 1,400. Given the principal objectives of 
this paper, to understand the historical nature and impact of this transformation, 
particularly in terms of workers’ experiences, two complementary data sets, which marry 
‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ are utilised. 
 
Firstly, semi-structured interviews were conducted with all workers with a start date prior 
to 1986, and who were continuously employed in the basic grade clerical occupations 
entitled Customer Service Representative (CSR) and Senior Customer Service 
Representative, up to the period of research (2003-4). Excluding many who had been 
promoted or who changed roles, the forty-three remaining subjects (25 males and 18 
females) who fulfilled these criteria provide, from the perspective of active participants at 
the point of production, a unique testimony of continuity and discontinuity in the labour 
process. Understandably, given that some had as much as forty years service, interviews 
typically lasted five or six hours and were completed in two or three sessions. The 
research was consciously guided by oral history methods and techniques (Shopes, 2004), 
which have been rarely adopted in industrial sociology. While recognising difficulties 
associated with the use of this ‘maddeningly imprecise’ (Shopes, 2004: 1) approach, we 
nevertheless take as a source of strength, oral history’s ability to reveal the meanings 
participants attach to events, phenomena and experiences. Further, it should be 
acknowledged that ‘memory is not a passive depository of facts, but an active process of 
creation of meanings’ (Portelli, 1981: 101). A unique value of oral testimony lies in 
participant’s attempts to make sense of their past and to give a form to their lives 
(Hubbard, 2000: 10; Truesdell, 2001: 1).  
 
In order to minimise methodological problems such as bias and unreliability, oral 
historians have long advocated confirming the validity of testimony through verification 
by, and comparison with, alternative sources (Schrager, 1983: 87; Thompson, 2000: 273; 
Lummis, 2002: 279; Shopes, 2004: 6). Consequently, we draw upon extensive hard, or 
written, evidence; company documentation, government reports and union bulletins. This 
permits the establishment of a ‘factual’ timeline of critical organisational events and an 
‘official’ record of changing work organisation at British Gas. However, these data sets 
should not be seen as discrete and stand alone. The research process involved iteration, as 
issues arising from the documentation stimulated additional questions and further 
reflection from interviewees while, simultaneously, insights generated by testimony 
prompted renewed interrogation of the ‘objective’ sources.  
 
The Context - British Gas from State Monopoly to Privatisation  
 
External economic and political factors determined the strategic re-direction of British 
Gas and, over time, generated pressures leading to the transformation of established 
forms of work organisation. While privatisation and the forced commercialisation of 
British Gas, by the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, were the decisive 
environmental factors, it is important to make the general observation that no direct and 
immediate chain of causality lay between external shock and change in the organisation 
(and experience) of work. The process of how macro-level events impact upon the labour 
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process is complex and non-linear. Mindful of Hyman’s (1987) admonition to appreciate 
the gap between strategy and outcome, there are key salient, mediating factors, including 
management specifying exactly how workplace change can be effected, the availability 
(or otherwise) of facilitating technologies and the ability to negotiate change through 
existing industrial relations machinery at both national and local levels.  
 
Following government injunctions to British Gas to increase gas prices to reflect the true 
cost of extraction and supply (BGC Annual Report, 1988: 259) - moves intended to make 
the state monopoly attractive to potential investors - privatisation was enabled with the 
1986 Gas Act. Consistent with government policy to shrink the public sector, and 
following British Telecom’s (BT) privatisation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 259; 
Saunders and Harris, 1994: 5; Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994: 334; Farnham and 
Horton, 1994: 13; Colling and Ferner, 1995: 495), BGC was renamed British Gas plc and 
commenced trading as a private company.   
 
However, it was not privatisation per se that provided the real impetus to internal re-
organisation, but rather the consequences of ensuing regulation. The regime established 
by OFGAS followed the same approach as OFTEL had adopted with BT, and centred on 
price control. Regulation of gas prices was imposed in the form of RPI-x, where RPI was 
the Retail Price Index and ‘x’ an amount stipulated by OFGAS (Beesley, 1997: 393). The 
initial control, covering the period 1987 to 1992, set ‘x’ as 2 meaning gas prices must be 
reduced by 2 percent below the rate of inflation (BG plc Annual Report: 1987: 9). The 
control initially applied to the tariff segment of BG plc’s market, including domestic 
customers, but later included the non-tariff, or contract, segment, which comprised 30 
percent of BG plc’s revenue (Beesley, 1997: 399; Helm, 2003).  
 
It is difficult to overstate the enormous significance of these controls for work 
organisation, as BG plc was now compelled to focus on the need to minimise ‘internal 
costs’, and to maintain and improve its profitability. More specifically, the imperative to 
reduce labour costs became an obsession for a senior management, who believed that the 
foremost source of savings – and, later, expanded value - lay in what they regarded as the 
bloated, expensive and labour-intensive clerical operations. Additional external shocks in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s served merely to deepen these concerns. Principally, 
following a Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) enquiry in 1993, government 
decided upon a more fundamental restructuring of the gas industry. Many ministers and 
advisors had always been dissatisfied with the privatisation settlement that had retained 
the integrated nature of British Gas. Rather than pursuing de-merger the Government 
brought forward the timetable for introducing competition into the domestic market. The 
domestic tariff monopoly enjoyed by BG plc was to be phased out from 1996, and fully 
opened to competition by 1998, in line with Government plans for the electricity market. 
In order to appraise fully the extent and nature of change in the organisation of work it is 
necessary to consider clerical work, as it existed prior to privatisation and its subsequent 
transformation. 
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‘Before the Flood’ – Clerical Work Prior to the Call Centre 
 
Clerical Processing 
Here we consider clerical work in the three most important departments; ‘Records and 
Billing’, ‘Metering’ and ‘Debt Control’. For the purposes of our study, these departments 
provide an excellent basis for historical contrast between back-office and call centre 
operations. All the functions of records and billing and debt, and most of those of 
metering, continued, and continue, to be performed in the new call centre environment, 
even though the process changed. Concomitantly, clerical workers continued to work 
within the same function, albeit now conducted through a tele-mediated process. In sum, 
our study can benefit from comparing discontinuities in work organisation and task 
execution within the similar broadly-defined business functions.  
While work organisation was not homogeneous across Granton House and discrete 
paper-based clerical routines existed, and while differences existed between departments 
in terms of inter alia levels of required knowledge and time to complete tasks, it is 
possible to provide an archetypal depiction of the nature, experience and ethos of clerical 
work that prevailed during the 1970s, throughout the 1980s and even, to a lesser extent, 
into the early 1990s.  
 
In the largest department, Records and Billing, 250 clerks were responsible for creating 
and maintaining accurate customer records and producing customer bills. Several distinct 
sub-processes existed, including meter installations, removals, exchanges and billing. The 
closely linked Metering department was responsible for managing meter reading 
collection and inputting data onto customer records. Clerks planned the daily allocation 
of work to meter readers, ensured that meters were read twice yearly and dealt with ad 
hoc requests such as final readings. Customer correspondence was also answered in this 
department. Debt Control managed the process on domestic accounts, and involved 
issuing letters, replying to correspondence received and answering customer phone calls. 
As warrants were required to gain entry to customer’s property and disconnect supply in 
circumstances of unpaid debt, clerical work here was more regulated by company 
procedure than in other departments.  
 
Until 1993 clerical work was stratified, with several distinct hierarchical grades in each 
department, and employees performing tasks commensurate with their seniority and/or 
level of knowledge. BGC typically recruited ‘new starts’ as juniors aged 15 to 17 and 
assigned them to routine activities such as sorting mail and counting job cards, and only 
when deemed ‘responsible’ were they moved to customer account work. This indefinable 
attribute of ‘responsibility’ was acquired by ‘new starts’ through observations of more 
experienced colleagues and attending formal training. It was, though, more a rite of 
passage based on the judgment of experienced workers, than the product of formal 
supervisory assessment. Clerical pay-scales reflected this calibrated hierarchy, with 
grades ranging from S1, for routine batching and counting roles, to S3 for Senior Clerks 
who had a ‘team expert’ role and perhaps some supervisory responsibility. The bulk of 
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clerical jobs were within the S2 pay-scale dealing with routine customer enquiries and 
planning work for operational staff. Clerks within each department were assigned to 
customers residing in one of six geographical regions2.  
 
Notwithstanding the patently standardised nature of many routines, clerks did enjoy some 
autonomy, and reported exercising a degree of control over task performance. One 
Records and Billing clerk, when asked whether she found her job satisfying, recalled.  
 
I created my own satisfaction…I think it was the fact that I could set my own 
goals, that was really everything. It was my own niche and it suited my mind as 
you were left more or less alone. Also, in some ways because I knew I was good at 
it and as time went on management would come and ask me things as well because 
they knew I was reliable. You had your own defined job role and you were in 
control of it, you felt as though you were treated as an individual. They let you 
have responsibility and you were judged by how you responded and what you got 
done (Tania O’Connor, CSA, aged 51). 
 
Although set within defined parameters, clerks did have the opportunity to fully resolve 
queries, seeing a task through to completion, which was both a consequence of, and 
served to reinforce, this sense of control and, to use what the context of the period is an 
anachronistic HRM term, ‘ownership’. Evidently, the acquisition of accumulated tacit 
and formal knowledge, and progression to expert status bestowed on clerks a sense of 
worth. This comment is, again, typical of many.  
 
In those days, if you were very knowledgeable about your job then you could get 
other staff asking you for help. You would also help or teach a new member of 
staff the relevant jobs. You did have the feeling that they were acknowledging that 
you knew your job. It gave me more confidence within myself and that’s why I 
wanted to progress in the office. (Linda Munroe, Compliance Officer, aged 49). 
 Supervision and the Absence of Performance Management 
 
With the exception of the correspondence processes, no formal performance measures 
existed prior to the call centre’s arrival. Clerks completed their own worksheets and 
handed them to supervisors at day’s end, but these were used to compile workflow 
figures rather than to manage individual performance. The variable volumes of clerical 
tasks meant that workloads were typically cleared on a daily basis. Clerks could, and 
would, vary their pace of work largely because each morning they were presented 
physically with the volume of work that had to be completed by closing time. Further, 
given sectional autonomy within each department, it was rare for clerks to be asked to 
complete the work of others.  
 
                                                          
2 The six areas were Edinburgh, Glasgow, West Scotland, Central Scotland, Perthshire/Fife and Aberdeen/ 
Dundee.   
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The supervisor played a minor role in managing individual clerk’s workloads, acting 
rather as technical expert, often undertaking clerical duties that required authorisation of 
expenses, or the allocation of allowances to customer accounts. There was a tacit 
understanding that certain clerical duties took longer than others to complete, and 
supervisors were sensitive to the fact that completion levels would vary across their 
section, depending on the particular tasks being performed.   
 
I think they accepted the fact that you had your good days and your bad days 
because you could get work that was more difficult. It depended what area of work 
you were dealing with at the time. So people recognised that certain people would 
do one thing and certain people would do others (Tania O’Connor).  
 
The testimonies reveal evidence of informal output norms. Many clerks reported they had 
become aware of what constituted a ‘typical’ day’s clearance from the ‘responsible’ clerk 
who had initially trained them.  The underlying purpose seemed to be to establish a 
workload that would occupy the clerk for an entire day, but was also achievable.    
 
[There wasn’t really any monitoring of work or performance targets]. You did a 
worksheet but it was just basically so they could do the figures (clearances), what 
you got in, what you cleared etc. It was up to them to make sure that the work was 
done. If the work was cleared you could relax. The work always got done [because 
of] loyalty, basically, to the company. (Nellie Saunders, CSA, aged 51) 
 
Unlike in Records and Billing, and Metering, the correspondence teams in Debt Control 
did have formal performance targets, by virtue of service standards deriving from the 
terms of British Gas’ licence3. However, these did not lead to strict targets, but confirm 
the picture of informal expectations regarding output and sensitivity towards clerks.  
 
There was an amount expected from you each day. When you were sitting in with 
an experienced member of the team to learn the job, you would be made aware of 
what was expected [which] remained fairly constant throughout my time there. 
Your supervisor was aware of the type of enquiries you were dealing with. If you 
had been given fairly straightforward work to do then the work should be cleared 
quickly. He could check the register to find out how much work you had on your 
desk. If you were dealing with awkward enquiries then you were allowed more 
time to deal with them. (Linda Munroe, SCSA, aged 49) 
 
That the role of the supervisor differed between departments was partly a reflection of 
diversity in clerical activity across Granton House, and partly the result  of a comparative 
informality, sanctioned by senior management. This afforded the opportunity for 
supervisors to adopt, within the constraint of ensuring ‘the work gets done’, variable 
styles and approaches. In Metering, for example, supervisors were frequently regarded as 
remote but benign figures, as is evidenced by the response of this clerk when asked how 
much contact she had with her immediate supervisors.  
 
                                                          
3 90 percent of correspondence received had to be cleared within five working days of receipt. 
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As little as possible (laughs). They were only really there if you had a problem or 
needed to book a holiday. You were in full control of your job and you had a sort 
of a routine where things were done on a certain day. You just got yourself 
through. A lot of it was preparation for the metering folios coming up, that kind of 
took up a lot of time. You got left alone to get on with it. (Sally Burnett, CSA, 
aged 52) 
 
Work Culture 
 
The work culture of Granton House was the product, and legacy, of a nationalised 
industry, having developed in a period of corporatism. It also reflected its 
institutionalised industrial relations framework, in which trade unionism exercised 
considerable influence. Without romanticising what was indisputably the performance of 
routinised white-collar work, since a premium was placed nevertheless on clerical 
knowledge and professional service, it would be more apt to characterise the labour 
process as ‘responsible autonomy’ rather than ‘direct control’. And, workers 
demonstrably enjoyed a level of discretion within their quotidian work routines, being 
relatively free to visit the canteen, take comfort breaks and converse with colleagues. 
With no tied breaks these informal flexibilities had become established as custom and 
practise. 
 
I think as long as you did your work they didn’t mind you going to the canteen for 
whatever, or going for your coffee. It certainly wasn’t restricted as in, you know, 
timed at the toilet or somebody watching. You were free to walk about. (Margaret 
Norris, CSR, aged 47) 
 
Symptomatic of the relatively relaxed atmosphere were attitudes to working time. For 
two decades (1976-95), through flexi-time, clerks managed their working hours providing 
that at month end they had met their contractual obligations. Further, there was a tacit 
understanding that clerks could agree collectively their working hours to ensure sufficient 
staffing levels throughout the day.  
 
In sum, in terms of the extent of discretion clerks enjoyed within a long-established and 
relatively unchanging work organisation, the pattern of informal knowledge acquisition, 
the lightness of supervisory touch, the deep sense of clerical professionalism and 
expertise, and the absence of detailed and strict controls over time and output, the 
contrast with the later call centre regime could not be starker.  
 
‘The Old Order is Rapidly Fading’: the Emergence of the Call Centre 
 
In the aftermath of privatisation, two key developments, in 1993 and 1997 respectively, 
intensified BG plc senior management’s preoccupation with cost – particularly labour 
cost – reduction. Firstly, in response to the MMC Report, BG plc restructured in order to 
manage its supply and transmission divisions as separate entities, splitting into five 
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businesses4 within the domestic market. From inception the new organisations had much 
flatter hierarchies and utilised generic job descriptions to increase labour flexibility (BG 
Plc Annual Report 1993: 2) and to erode the old graded job hierarchies, which were 
perceived to be inappropriate for the new environment. Central to driving the competitive 
culture and business model (BG Plc Annual Report, 1995: 10) was a radical departure in 
customer servicing, by which major investment was made in the telephony infrastructure 
to facilitate a new national billing system, Tariff Gas Billing (TGB), which would replace 
the localised operations and realise economies of scale. Within three years (1995-98) the 
customer service departments of BGT were transformed from geographically-based 
clerical processing centres into fully-blown call centres with a UK-wide remit. Just as 
widespread redundancies accompanied the contemporaneous penetration of the call 
centre model throughout the financial services sector, so too did BG plc’s restructuring 
programme involve significant workforce reduction.  
A billing clerk recalled the occasion when she was informed of the proposed introduction 
of the call centre.  
  
I guess it was in ’94 or ’95 when I was on TGB training and my pals were all 
leaving on voluntary redundancy (laughs). They just kept talking about all these 
things that were going to happen, telling you that you would get a call and deal 
with it right to the end and used these big words such as empowerment – these 
were all buzz words at that time. They didn’t really use the words ‘call centre’ 
though, just that you would be on the phones for so many hours a day. I mean they 
said that we would be on the phones in the morning and then come off in the 
afternoon to do correspondence. Turned out kinda different eh? (Margaret Norris, 
CSA, aged 47) 
 
The first experience of call centre environment provided a genuine shock. In spring 1995, 
a general bureau initially serving Scottish customers was established to facilitate the 
downsizing of Records and Billing and Metering. The Newcastle office was then closed 
and its work migrated to Edinburgh, doubling the bureau’s size. Difficulties with the new 
billing system, excessive call volumes and the inexperience of call operators resulted in a 
precipitous decline in customer service quality. Between late 1995 and the spring 1996 it 
was common for between 150 and 250 calls to be stacked waiting to be answered, leading 
to widespread customer abuse of call handlers, particularly from those in the north-east of 
England, who resented the closure of their previously local service.  The glaring contrast 
between this ‘new world’ of call centre work and the ‘old world’ of clerical processing 
provided an unwelcome foretaste of how their experience of work was to be permanently 
changed.  
 
In 1997, the Performance Enhancement Programme (PEP) benchmarked operating costs 
against those of BGT’s principal competitors, the Regional Electricity Companies 
(RECs). PEP concluded that the cost to BGT of servicing a customer was £22.10, as 
compared to the RECs’ £16.30 (PEP presentation, 1998). In seeking to reduce this 
                                                          
4 Public Gas Supply (PGS), Contract Trading, Transportation and Storage, Servicing and Installation and 
Retail. 
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differential BGT concluded that £104 million savings in operating costs had to be 
achieved through applying the test of ‘best value’ to every customer service operation. 
The ensuing ‘Organise to Win’ (OTW) project completely re-organised BGT’s eight area 
customer service offices, which had hitherto performed the full range of services for its 
regional customers. As discussed above, the distance shrinking ICTs, integral to the call 
centre, facilitate economies of scale, overheads reduction and functional specialisation 
(Miozzo and Ramirez, 2003; Marshall and Richardson, 1996; Taylor and Bain, 1999). In 
this case, OTW segmented the eight sites into four dedicated call centres (Edinburgh, 
Leeds, Croydon and Southampton), three billing offices (Manchester, Solihull and 
Barnet) and one national sales office (Cardiff). OTW was to deliver workforce reduction 
of 927 over three years and net revenue savings of £15.382 million over three years 
(OTW Business Case, 1997).  
 
Yet, the call centre was not simply the embodiment of the cost efficient logic 
(Korczynski, 2002), but was perceived as a site of strategic importance in terms of adding 
value. BG plc’s new owners, Centrica, viewed the customer database as its greatest asset, 
seeking to increase revenue through selling a range of services. Telescoping a longer 
evolution that occurred in financial service call centres (Bain and Taylor, 2002; Taylor 
and Bain, 2001a: 53), British Gas call centres increasingly embraced selling and 
marketing activities, and agents were expected to hit sales targets as well as perform 
quality customer service (Centrica, 1998).  
 
The wholesale migration of processes between sites, which took place between 1997 and 
1999, intensified and deskilled work for the vast majority of BGT employees. The 
existing ACD equipment was replaced with BT’s Featurenet 5000 system, creating a 
virtual call centre, where calls were allocated to free agents in any of the four centres. 
Streaming specific call types to appropriately trained agents increased productivity 
maximised on-call and reduced ‘idle time’. Tariff Gas Billing (TGB), built upon a 
Windows platform, featured extensive online help facilities. The discretion clerks had 
enjoyed in task performance was suddenly and permanently foreclosed, as tacit 
knowledge was codified into a series of pre-programmed tasks, which guided the clerk, 
step-by-step through menus, screens and dialogues boxes. In essence, TGB was an 
application of the ‘Babbage principle’ (Braverman, 1974: 195 ) and represented one of 
the most significant of several moves towards the degradation of clerical work, which by 
1999 included call scripting. With the introduction of TGB and the customer-facing 
‘Front End’, ‘knowledge’ and professionalism were abruptly replaced by speed and 
efficiency as the most highly valued worker attributes at British Gas. 
 
Call recording technology, introduced in 1999, taped all incoming calls, logging the date, 
time, duration and identity of call handler. Although the espoused reason was to enable 
‘verbal contracts’ with customers, removing the need for paper forms when setting up 
direct debits, performance improvement was the underlying objective. Previously random 
call monitoring had been undertaken in ‘real time’, with a supervisor sitting next to the 
agent. Although experienced as intrusive agents did know that the frequency of 
monitoring was restricted by supervisor availability and that no record of their interaction 
with the customer remained. Now, by contrast, agents knew that every word spoken, and 
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every decision taken, left an ‘imprint’ that could later be used for monitoring and even 
disciplinary purposes. Affording the opportunity to appraise remotely and retrospectively 
the performance of workers, the introduction of call recording should be seen as 
contributing significantly to the redrawing of the frontier of control in management’s 
favour.  
 
Experiencing Change 
 
Respondents were adamant that these new systems both restricted their freedom to decide 
on appropriate solutions to customer enquiries, and eliminated the organisation’s reliance 
upon their knowledge. 
 
I felt previously you had to understand the job and have a good working 
knowledge of it actually to do the work. I don’t think there is that requirement to 
have this knowledge nowadays. There is a lot more help facilities available via 
your computer, like on TGB there is what is called front end call scripting. (Linda 
Munroe, Compliance Officer, aged 49) 
 
Since, in scarcely three years, the call centre had become the dominant form of work, 
clerks were faced with the choice of transferring to it or leaving the organisation. 
However, despite significant misgivings and apprehension, the age, length of service, 
lack of formal qualifications and personal circumstances of most of the survivors of the 
voluntary redundancy programme, meant that exit was simply not a feasible alternative. 
In this sense, the transition to call centre work was less a choice than a compulsion. The 
universal refrain of this cohort of Granton House employees was that that the arrival of 
call centre profoundly changed the quality of their work lives, for the worse. The 
following response to the question asking how she felt about the move into the call centre 
is typical and succinct.   
 
My lovely quiet life with no hassle whatsoever had suddenly changed. Then you 
were getting the odd barney with people and your lovely job that you had liked 
with no hassle just disappeared. (Nora Castle, CSA, aged 43) 
 
‘In the Wake of the Flood’: After the Call Centre 
 
Working Time, Intensification and the End of the ‘Relaxed’ Atmosphere 
 
It is notable how the more optimistic accounts of the call centre make scant, or no, 
mention of how this organisational innovation transforms the use of working time, with 
profound consequences for workers (e.g. Frenkel et al, 1999). Inextricably bound up with 
the centralisation of function and the achievement of economies of scale are both the 
extension of working hours and an intensification of working effort, as the gaps between 
tasks during which the body or mind rests – the ‘porosity’ of the working day (Green, 
2001) – are filled. In these regimes of lean service delivery, what matters most is the 
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close matching of staffing levels to the actual, or anticipated, volumes of customer 
demand. The emergence of the call centre in BGT was dependent on the destruction of 
traditional clerical work patterns. From 1995, through the ‘Planned Flexible Working’ 
collective agreement, management had the authority to calibrate working time to meet 
operational requirements, to extend weekday hours to 8pm and to introduce Saturday 
working. The net effect was to corrode the hitherto, and much reported, relaxed 
atmosphere.   
 
Continuous call delivery and extensive monitoring of agent availability and output 
necessarily restricted call-handlers’ ability to leave their desks. On pain of disciplinary 
action for failure to do so, agents now had to enter codes at their turrets, indicating when 
they were ‘not ready’ to take calls or when they left their workstation. Comfort breaks 
were now restricted to 4% of working time, fifteen minutes in a shift of 7½ hours. These 
constraints appear as contemporary expressions of what E.P. Thompson once referred to 
as ‘time thrift’ in his account of employers’ imposition of temporal discipline in the early 
years of industrial capitalism. These restrictions were universally detested.  
 
You are talking to an adult, a mother of two kids, two grown up kids and people talk to 
you like a child. I’m a responsible person. So what if I have been away for twenty 
minutes, I don’t do it every day. Again this is where they should understand their staff. 
(Lesley Jones, CSA, aged 48) 
 
Supervision, Performance Management and Lack of Control 
 
Clerks recalled the frenzied atmosphere as performance management became something 
of a fixation for supervisors. The imposition of monitoring and quantitative targets 
contributed further to the degradation of work, stripping clerks of what was left of their 
sense of individuality. 
 
[The call centre made the environment] totally impersonalised. You are not a 
person anymore; you are actually a badge number. When I started here you had 
your own individuality, you had your own job to do and you were left to carry on 
with it. You had responsibility. You were a person. (Maureen Taylor, CSA, aged 
56) 
 
Workers, able to make the contrast with the previous work regime, were acutely aware of 
the loss of control.  
 
You don’t have control. Your job is to work on the phones as soon as you get in. 
You have to be logged on to the phone to take the first call, by the time your shift 
starts, and as you close the last call another one appears in your ear. It’s never 
ending and you just have to sit there and react to these voices. Pretty depressing 
really. (Steven King, CSA, aged, 46) 
 
Mechanisation had produced a simultaneous degradation of work and quality of customer 
service which offended the experienced cohort of clerks. Socialised as little a decade 
earlier into an entirely different regime, some now strove to humanise their working lives 
by perpetuating older work practices. Confronted, still, with diverse and complex queries, 
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agents responded by keeping ‘pending’ files open, working on accounts through meal 
breaks, and utilising personal contacts in other offices in attempts to deliver personalised 
resolution that had characterised the old ethos. For management who now idealised 
simplified agent-customer interaction, through tight scripting and automated systems, 
these behaviours were regarded as archaic and unnecessary.   
 
The call centre had dramatically changed the role of the supervisor, essentially from 
being supportive to being directive.   
 
Well, they are not expected to know your job anymore so they can’t really help 
you with problems. They are also a lot less accessible, I mean although I never 
really needed to talk to my Supervisors in the past I knew I could if I had a 
problem. Now if you went up to them if they have not already asked to speak to 
you then you have to make an appointment. All I can see of them is that they are 
there to ensure you meet your targets. They are here to do FARE (the time 
management system) to tell you if you can or cannot have a holiday and to chase 
you around the building if you are late logging onto the phone. (Lesley Jones, 
CSA, aged 48)  
 
Monitoring and correcting individual performance arguably constituted the most 
significant change in the role of supervisors. Individual agent’s output was now measured 
against their contribution to aggregate team and centre-wide targets, unlike previously, 
where collective output had simply been recorded.  
 
Now you could actually pinpoint to a second what everybody was doing. One 
situation I remember was with one of the team who was very thorough at their 
job…OK they weren’t getting their hundred calls a day, and were only maybe 
getting seventy, but it was consistent. But the manager wasn’t very happy about 
that and was demanding to see an increase in volume. Before, there wasn’t any 
emphasis on your call handling, only that you answered the phone when it rang. 
They didn’t have grade of service (targets), you couldn’t monitor how many calls 
were actually waiting to come through, the phone rang, you answered it. You 
didn’t know if there was ten people waiting to get through, whereas now you do. 
(Steve Bailey, SCSA, aged 49)  
 
Evidence from a separate research project during 2000-1 confirms the new realities of 
work at Granton House (Taylor et al, 2003). Three-quarters of call-handler survey 
respondents reported being ‘quite’ or ‘very pressurised’ as a result of work on a normal 
day. The greatest cause was ‘having to meet targets’, identified by 74% of agents as 
contributing either ‘a great deal’ or ‘to some extent’ to feeling pressurised. Additional 
distinctive, and closely related, aspects of the new call centre labour process – lack of 
time, between calls, repetitiveness, call monitoring and having to keep to scripts – were 
cited as significant sources of pressure. The consequences of such tightly scripted, 
intensively monitored and quantitatively driven work routines was that many workers 
were self-evidently close to exhaustion and emotional withdrawal (Deery et al, 2002; 
Taylor et al, 2003: 442-4).  
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Conclusion 
 
While the preceding period had witnessed minor, incremental adjustment, the years 
between 1995 and 1998 signified a watershed in both the organisation of work and 
workers’ experiences. Reorganisation was abrupt and far-reaching, and amounted to a 
fundamental discontinuity in clerical processing and customer servicing. More change 
occurred in this concentrated burst than had taken place in the previous quarter century.  
Pivotal to the transformation was the introduction of a sophisticated ACD system, which 
facilitated radically new job design and social organisation of work. By the early 1990s, 
when BG plc management were forced to confront the central problematic of labour cost 
reduction, there were abundant examples from financial services and telecommunications 
of the benefits that the application of the ICTs, integral to the lean production call centre 
model, would bring. By now, it was clear that the call centre’s inherent technological 
properties could facilitate the following; the possibilities of remote servicing, economies 
of scale, an augmented division of labour, the unprecedented measurement of output in 
white-collar work, close monitoring and surveillance of workers, radical departures in the 
utilisation of work time. However, this is not a tale of technological determinism. In 
public utilities, as in finance and telecommunications, the impetus to adoption lay as 
much in regulatory change in the political and economic environment, and in capitalist 
competitive pressures operating at macro, sectoral and inter-firm level, as in the 
technological availability of an alternative customer servicing paradigm. However, 
mindful of replacing one error, technological determinism and an internalised focus on 
workplace control, with another, mechanically imputing workplace change from market 
change, environmental and competitive forces are seen to shape rather than determine 
work and employment relations (Hyman, 1987; Taylor et al, 2005). It did take almost a 
decade from 1986, for the fuller consequences of privatisation to work themselves 
through, and to produce the sharp discontinuity in work organisation that the call centre 
instigated.  
 
Our retrospective, longitudinal approach, based on both company documentation and oral 
testimony, affords a rare opportunity to situate change in work organisation and worker 
experience in historical perspective. To return to the paper’s point of departure, such an 
approach throws into sharp relief the limitations of studies which consciously or 
unconsciously eschew the importance of context, and rely solely upon static snap shots. 
Although aware of the dangers of generalising from one case study, the evidence from 
British Gas does call into question Holman’s (2002) sweeping generalisation that call 
centre work is not very different from other forms of clerical work in terms of worker 
experiences. The contrast between the nature and rhythms of work prior to, and 
following, the advent of the call centre at British Gas, is striking and remarkable. To 
reiterate, this is not to idealise earlier work, for as many studies have demonstrated the 
pre-call centre white-collar work could be highly routinised and Taylorised (Glenn and 
Feldberg, 1977; Crompton and Reid, 1982; Crompton and Jones, 1984; Baldry et al, 
1998).  
 
However, clerical workers at British Gas for decades patently enjoyed a degree of 
discretion in task performance, exercised some control over working time and the pace of 
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work, and were able to leverage a sense of professionalism and satisfaction from acting 
as experts and providing good customer service. In harsh contrast, the call centre abruptly 
delivered targets, monitoring, timed toilet breaks, call queues, repetitiveness, the removal 
of informal controls over output and time and directive supervision. In a parody of 
Walton (1985) longer serving workers experienced a transition from commitment to 
control, rather than its opposite. Acutely aware of work degradation, they might have 
been less conscious that, directly and indirectly, their experiences were causally linked to 
new patterns of accumulation characterised by changes in technology, firm structure, the 
organisation of work and political economy. From this perspective the call centre can be 
seen as an emblematic product of a neo-liberalist age, in which labour has been 
intensified and the rate of exploitation increased. For some, in this brave new world, the 
prospect was bleak. 
 
At the end of the day although you had slaved away, working hard, you had felt 
that everything you had done, you know, had been worth it. And suddenly it 
doesn’t matter, it doesn’t matter. It’s no longer there. Your job is nothing. (Lesley 
Jones, CSA, aged 48) 
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